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CRAZY IN ALABAMA: JUDICIAL PROCESS AND
THE LAST STAND AGAINST MARRIAGE
EQUALITY IN THE LAND OF GEORGE
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INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in
Obergefell v. Hodges that prohibitions on same-sex marriage violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 In hindsight, the decision seems inevitable, the
culmination of a precisely two-year race towards marriage equality that
began with the Court’s 2013 invalidation of the federal Defense of Marriage
Act on June 26, 2013.2 Federal trial and appellate courts were almost
uniform in declaring state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional,3 and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari4 or stays of judgment5 in all of those
cases. Additionally, high-ranking public officials in several states gave up
their opposition to marriage equality, ordering the issuance of licenses to
same-sex couples even before all litigation had concluded.6
Alabama represented the glaring exception. During winter and spring
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2015, with Obergefell looming, Alabama state officials and the Supreme
Court of Alabama took an increasingly firm stand against marriage equality
and against multiple decisions of a lower federal court invalidating the
state’s constitutional7 and statutory8 bans on same-sex marriage. For many,
these efforts echoed in Alabama’s unfortunate civil rights history—
segregationist Governor George Wallace standing in the doorway of the
University of Alabama to prevent admitted African-American students from
registering;9 fire hoses, police dogs, and violence;10 systematic attempts to
silence anti-segregation voices;11 and massive resistance to Brown and to
integration.12 In characterizing the actions of Alabama officials as defiance
and rebellion against the federal judiciary13 or as “reckless rejection of
federal constitutional principles,”14 reporters, commentators, and advocates
too easily linked the current controversy over marriage equality to old
opposition to integration. Even those who acknowledged the procedural
regularity of these officials’ actions nonetheless viewed procedural
regularity as a cover for discrimination.15 It was 1963 all over again, with
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore playing the role of Wallace’s heir in
bigoted defiance of the federal judiciary and disregard for the federal
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Constitution.16
But while the comparison was easy, it also was, as a matter of judicial
process, inaccurate.
In fact, the controversy in Alabama is significant for what it
demonstrates about judicial procedure and the limited scope of injunctive
relief in constitutional litigation. It reveals how judicial decisionmaking and
judicial remedies actually function in a geographically divided and
hierarchical federal judiciary. True, the resulting process was uncertain,
inefficient, chaotic, and even ugly. To the extent this triggered concerns for
“the integrity of the judicial system, which rises and falls on the public’s
perception,”17 one might complain that this process shook public confidence
in the system. But the appropriate response is to change the public’s
perception and understanding of how the judicial process really operates in
constitutional litigation and why. When George Wallace stood in the
doorway fifty years ago, he did so in defiance of a federal court injunction
directed at him and compelling him to refrain from interfering with the
admission of African-American students to the University of Alabama.18 By
contrast, Alabama’s last stand against marriage equality was about the steps
necessary to produce that binding federal order against a proper defendant
as to proper plaintiffs in the face of procedural reality.
Obergefell has settled the constitutional debate over marriage equality,
rendering the events of those several months in Alabama a historical
footnote, a final speed bump in an inexorable move to marriage equality
that we will remember in just that way. Nevertheless, these events illustrate
the procedure at the heart of constitutional and civil rights enforcement and
are therefore worth exploring in that light. And because marriage equality
will not be the last constitutional controversy contested in the federal
courts, judges, attorneys, the media, and the public must recognize and
understand these procedural realities.
JUDICIAL ORDERS AND LITIGATION CHAOS
In late January 2015, Judge Callie Granade of the Southern District of
Alabama twice held that Alabama’s same-sex marriage bans violated the
Fourteenth Amendment—first in Searcy v. Strange,19 brought by a female
couple married in California and seeking a second-parent adoption in
Alabama, and second in Strawser v. Strange,20 brought by two same-sex
16
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couples seeking marriage licenses in Mobile. The sole named defendant in
both actions was Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange. Both
injunctions prohibited Strange from enforcing state laws banning same-sex
marriage. The Strawser injunction further bound his “officers, agents,
servants and employees, and others in active concert or participation with
any of them, who would seek to enforce the marriage laws of Alabama
which prohibit same-sex marriage,” incorporating the injunctive scope
permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2).21
In Alabama, however, responsibility for issuing marriage licenses rests
with probate judges22 who are members of the judicial branch,23 although
performing executive or administrative functions such as issuing marriage
licenses.24 The licensing power does not rest with the state attorney general
or with any executive branch official subject to his control. Given state
separation of powers principles, the attorney general also lacks any
supervisory authority over probate judges. Alabama thus presented a bizarre
situation. The state officials empowered to issue marriage licenses to samesex couples were not parties to the federal litigation and not required by the
resulting injunction to issue any licenses or to refrain from enforcing the
marriage ban. The only state official subject to the injunction—the attorney
general—lacked the power to issue, or order anyone else to issue, marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. There also did not appear to be any single
state-level official who could supervise and control the state’s probate
judges.
Compare this with, for example, litigation over California’s
Proposition 8 (Prop 8). Two same-sex couples sued six executive officer
defendants—the Governor, the state attorney general, the director and
deputy director of the state Department of Public Health (DPH), and the
county clerk–recorders (the officials who actually issue licenses) for two
counties. After finding that Prop 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the
district court permanently enjoined the six defendant officials from
applying or enforcing the state marriage ban and directed them to ensure
that all persons under their control or supervision similarly did not enforce
the ban.25 As that injunction was ready to take effect,26 California Attorney
General Kamala Harris advised DPH officials to notify all county clerks
21
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that they were similarly subject to the injunction and should begin issuing
marriage licenses to all couples who wanted them. Because DPH controlled
county clerk–recorders in administering the state’s marriage license and
certification laws,27 the injunction against the attorney general and the DPH
officers effectively enjoined these nonparties subject to their control. And
those high-level state officials ordered county-level officials to behave as if
the injunction covered all requesting couples.
Judge Granade temporarily stayed the injunctions in Searcy and
Strawser to allow the Eleventh Circuit to consider whether a stay pending
appeal was warranted,28 thereby leaving time for affected actors to consider
the scope and effect of those orders. The Alabama Probate Judges
Association advised its members not to issue licenses to same-sex couples;
because no probate judge was subject to any federal court order, doing so
violated the still-existing state law ban on issuing licenses to same-sex
couples.29 Chief Justice Moore went one step further, asserting his authority
as the chief administrative officer of the state courts to first advise against30
and then prohibit31 probate judges from issuing licenses, emphasizing the
limited scope of Judge Granade’s injunction, its nonapplication to probate
judges, and the limited precedential authority of district court decisions.
Similar confusion about the scope of a district court injunction had
arisen in Florida earlier the same month. Judge Robert Hinkle of the
Northern District of Florida had declared invalid that state’s same-sex
marriage ban and had enjoined one clerk to grant a license to one couple in
one county.32 The Florida Association of County Clerks (FACC) advised its
members that the injunction did not compel any other clerk to issue a
license to any other couple and recommended that nonparty clerks refrain
from issuing licenses in violation of state law.33 Judge Hinkle responded
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with an “Order on the Scope of the Preliminary Injunction,” reminding
everyone of the historic evils of resistance to federal judicial efforts to
vindicate constitutional rights, and insisting that, while his injunction did
not require any nonparty clerks to issue licenses to other couples, “the
Constitution” did.34 This worked in Florida—both the FACC35 and the
Florida attorney general36 acceded to clerks issuing licenses without
awaiting further lawsuits, orders, or appeals. It worked so well, in fact, that
Judge Granade similarly “clarified” her Searcy order by block-quoting
several paragraphs from Judge Hinkle’s order, notably the insistence that
“the Constitution” required issuance of licenses even by nonparty officials
to nonparty couples.37
On Monday, February 9, the Strawser and Searcy stays expired when
the Supreme Court of the United States (over dissent of Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia) refused to further stay the Searcy injunction.38
Thus did marriage equality come to Alabama, albeit haltingly—within the
first two days, probate judges in only sixteen of the state’s sixty-seven
counties were issuing licenses to same-sex couples.39
Seeking to eliminate the intrastate inconsistency, the federal plaintiffs
returned to Judge Granade. The Searcy plaintiffs moved to have Probate
Judge Don Davis of Mobile—the judge who had refused their adoption in
light of the state prohibition on recognizing same-sex marriages—held in
contempt for violating the injunction. Judge Granade swiftly and correctly
rejected the request, pointing out that Davis was not a party in Searcy, not
subject to the injunction, and not subject to the court’s contempt power.40
Moreover, it would have been incoherent to hold Davis in contempt for
failing to issue licenses to nonparty couples seeking to be married when the
applicable injunction arose in an adoption case involving a married couple.
The Strawser plaintiffs—whose action did involve issuance of
marriage licenses—made the more appropriate and effective move. They
amended their complaint to add Davis as a defendant and to add two new
couples as plaintiffs. Two days later, Judge Granade extended the
34
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injunction to Davis as to all four plaintiff-couples.41 Probate judges in more
(although still not all) counties responded to the expanded order by
beginning to issue licenses.
The key to understanding these moves, as well as the source of
confusion, is the inherently limited nature of judicial decisions and judicial
awards of injunctive relief. Even when addressing important constitutional
and social issues such as due process, equal protection, and marriage
equality, a court resolves only a discrete dispute between particular,
identified parties, producing an order that controls their rights, obligations,
and behavior as to one another, but not behavior of or towards nonparties.42
Thus, neither of Judge Granade’s original injunctions prohibited any
probate judge from enforcing the same-sex marriage ban or obligated any
probate judge to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple, as none was
a defendant or subject to the control of a defendant. Expanding the Strawser
injunction against Judge Davis obligated only him, but no other probate
judge, to refrain from enforcing the ban and to issue licenses. And that
obligation extended only to the Strawser plaintiffs (four couples), but to no
one else.43
Along with the injunctions, Judge Granade also declared the marriage
bans constitutionally invalid. But those declarations functioned chiefly as
explanation and justification for her orders to the parties. The opinions
affected the rest of the world only through their precedential force and the
extent to which they might influence the next court in resolving a similar
constitutional question involving different parties.44 Importantly, however,
federal district opinions are not binding authority on any other court—state
court, other federal districts, the same federal district, or even the same
federal district judge in a subsequent case.45 This was another unique feature
of Alabama’s marriage-equality controversy—the Eleventh Circuit neither
spoke nor froze the status quo until it could speak. Thus, everything flowed
from decisions of a single trial judge rather than the decision of a court of
appeals, which at least would have provided binding precedent within the
circuit.
At best, Judge Granade’s opinion had persuasive authority; it might
convince another court to adopt the same understanding of the Fourteenth

41
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43
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Amendment and to order a new defendant to issue marriage licenses to new
plaintiffs. Her attempt to “clarify” the injunction (mimicking Judge
Hinkle’s move in Florida) did not—and, as a matter of law, could not—
change this reality. Licenses were required by “the Constitution” only as
interpreted by one district judge in a single judicial opinion that was not
binding on any other court or any other case. Moreover, a public official
cannot be in contempt of the Constitution, the district court’s declaration of
unconstitutionality, or the district court precedent; a person only can be in
contempt of a judicial order directed to him personally. Whatever Judge
Granade declared that the Constitution required, it did not actually obligate
any nonparty probate judge or clerk to follow that requirement.
Thus, that every other Alabama official did not voluntarily comply
with Judge Granade’s constitutional interpretation did not reflect Massive
Resistance Redux. Probate judges who declined to issue licenses were not
flouting the law, rebelling against the Constitution, or defying federal
authority in not abiding by a single non-binding precedent in a case to
which they were not party. Nor was Chief Justice Moore in advising and
ordering probate judges that they were not obligated by the order or bound
by the precedent. The constitutional question remained open and it was
possible (if unlikely) that the next district judge might rule differently on
the constitutional question in the next action.
Of course, nothing prohibited nonparty probate judges from
voluntarily acting in accordance with Judge Granade’s non-binding order,
rather than forcing new parties to commence new constitutional litigation
against them.46 In fact, judicial and political processes incentivize them to
do so. The likely result of a new lawsuit by a new couple—especially in the
Southern District, where any action would be assigned to Judge Granade
under the district’s related-case rule47—was practically (albeit not legally) a
foregone conclusion. Moreover, any probate judge who forced a lawsuit
and was enjoined would have been liable for the plaintiffs’ reasonable
attorney’s fees, as every couple obtaining injunctive relief compelling
issuance of a marriage license would qualify as a “prevailing party” in a
constitutional action.48 These incentives worked in states from California to
Florida, where officials recognized that it was not worth the time, expense,
or effort to force new litigation that they would lose; they began issuing
licenses to all requesting couples, even though not judicially compelled to
do so by an injunction that only guaranteed licenses to a few identified
46
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see, e.g., Stipulation and Agreement as to Costs and Attorneys’ Fees at ¶¶ 10–11, Wolf v. Walker, No.
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couples.
One nevertheless might argue that non-acquiescence was itself an act
of Massive Resistance to the extent it might have been motivated by animus
towards LGBT people and by moral objections to opening the institution of
civil marriage to them. But it is impossible to do more than speculate about
why individual probate judges acted or failed to act in a given way. More
importantly, it does not change the legal reality. Alabama public officials
were under no legal obligation to issue licenses or to refrain from enforcing
the state marriage ban other than within the limited scope of the controlling
federal injunction. And they could wait for that injunction, issued following
procedurally appropriate litigation, before acting in a certain way. That does
not change even if the decision to wait may have been made with bad
motives.
Once that injunction came, of course, a named probate judge would
become bound, and in continuing to refuse licenses, he would have been
defying a federal order or rebelling against the federal courts. But that never
seemed a real danger as to the probate judges who declined to acquiesce in
Judge Granade’s initial decision; several indicated their intent to abide by,
and thus their belief in the legitimacy of, any federal order that might issue
against them in the future.49
The distinction between a binding injunction and persuasive precedent
marks the fundamental difference between 2015 and 1963, between the
admittedly halting move towards marriage equality and Wallace’s stand in
the doorway against desegregation. And it shows why the Wallace analogy,
although rhetorically and politically powerful, remains inaccurate.
The students seeking to enroll at the University of Alabama in June
1963 had obtained an injunction from a federal district court ordering
university officials to admit them.50 Additionally, the United States had
obtained a separate injunction enjoining Wallace from interfering with
enforcement of that first injunction.51 In standing in the doorway, therefore,
Wallace did not merely defy principles of equality emanating from the
Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in recent Supreme Court decisions.52
He defied a federal court order, expressly binding on him and compelling
him to refrain from engaging in certain conduct. Had the United States
pursued the option, Wallace could have been held in contempt. And when
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, U.S. Marshals, and a
49
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Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) [http://perma.cc/WA6X-B7BM]; cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) [http://perma.cc/6RPP-8R7N].
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federalized National Guard ordered Wallace to stand aside, they acted as the
Executive Branch enforcing a valid and binding judicial order, not merely
an abstract judicial declaration that the Constitution prohibits segregation in
public higher education.
Neither Moore nor Wallace relied on the injunction–precedent
distinction. In his doorway speech, Wallace never mentioned the federal
judiciary or the federal injunction binding him at that moment; he spoke
only of the over-grasping “Central Government” and the absence of federal
legislation authorizing integration.53 This suggests that, in Wallace’s view,
even an injunction could not compel him to permit integration of the
university. Moore has been even more explicit that he and other state
officials may ignore any mandate they regard as unlawful, including one
issued by the Supreme Court.54
Regardless of whether either emphasized it, however, the distinction
remains essential and it controls any process-oriented understanding of
marriage-equality litigation in Alabama. Whatever one may believe about
the opinions, motivations, or morality of Moore and other state officials, it
does not alter the fact that none of them acted unlawfully or in disregard of
the law. None disobeyed any court order or otherwise attempted to shirk
binding legal duties. Moore was never enjoined, nor even an active litigant
in any federal litigation. Individual probate judges made seemingly good
faith efforts to determine their precise obligations, weighing competing
views from a number of sources. Once enjoined, Davis issued licenses to
the four plaintiff-couples in Strawser without public protest. And every
probate judge who spoke publicly indicated an intention to do the same, if
and when enjoined.
THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA ENTERS THE FRAY
The equilibrium that emerged from those first weeks—some probate
judges voluntarily complying, new plaintiffs initiating or expanding federal
litigation against probate judges who did not voluntarily comply, courts
issuing new or expanded injunctions and ordering more licenses—might
have held until the Supreme Court decided Obergefell.
But a new procedural wrinkle emerged in state court. In early March,
the Supreme Court of Alabama, exercising its original jurisdiction, issued a

53

Governor George C. Wallace, Statement and Proclamation at the University of Alabama (June
11, 1963), available at http://www.archives.state.al.us/govs_list/schooldoor.html [http://perma.cc/E3JA6F6L].
54
Lamparello, supra note 16, at 3–4; Jeremy Diamond, Chief Alabama Judge Would Defy Supreme
Court
in
Gay
Marriage
Ruling,
CNN
(Feb.
12,
2015,
12:40
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/ray-moore-alabama-gay-marraige-supreme-court-slavery
[http://perma.cc/89DH-LZE2]; Justin Snow, Roy Moore: Courts Cannot Redefine Biblical Marriage,
METROWEEKLY (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.metroweekly.com/2015/03/roy-moore-courts-cannotredefine-biblical-marriage.
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writ of mandamus prohibiting all probate judges from issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples.55
State mandamus had become a common move by state officials to
keep local officials from acquiescing in precedential decisions prior to a
binding injunction. For example, following Tenth Circuit decisions
invalidating marriage bans in Utah and Oklahoma, state officials in Kansas
(also located in the Tenth Circuit) obtained a temporary stay from the state
supreme court prohibiting county officials from issuing licenses,56 at least
until a federal court applied circuit precedent to hold that Kansas’s marriage
ban was similarly constitutionally defective and to enjoin its enforcement.57
South Carolina officials followed a similar course in response to the Fourth
Circuit invalidating Virginia’s ban when a local official stated his intent to
issue licenses to same-sex couples.58
Even on this strategic move, however, Alabama posed an additional
wrinkle. Because Attorney General Strange was enjoined from enforcing
the same-sex marriage ban, he did not litigate the mandamus petition.
Instead, two private organizations petitioned as relators of the State.
In a 134-page per curiam opinion, six justices (with Chief Justice
Moore not participating and two justices dissenting) held that Alabama’s
same-sex marriage ban was constitutionally valid and must be enforced,
rejecting concerns about the organizations’ standing, questions about the
court’s own jurisdiction, Judge Granade’s contrary decisions, contrary
precedent from multiple lower federal courts, and repeated signals from the
Supreme Court of the United States.59 The result was statewide uniformity
going forward—no same-sex couples could obtain marriage licenses, at
least without a new federal court order. But the four couples granted
licenses under the Strawser injunction remained married, as did couples
granted licenses by other probate judges voluntarily complying with the
district court precedent.
This decision generated the strongest denunciations of state–federal
stalemates60 and accusations of defiance and rebellion by the state supreme
55

Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *43 (Ala. Mar. 3,
2015) [http://perma.cc/4CBZ-G83T].
56
Kansas ex rel. Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112,590, slip op. at 2 (Kan. Oct. 10, 2014), available at
http://www.kscourts.org/State_v_Moriarty/112590.pdf [http://perma.cc/PW3E-3R5X].
57
Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-02518-DDC/TTJ, 2014 WL 5598128 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2014)
[https://perma.cc/8KET-DFCE].
58
Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (D. S.C. 2014) [http://perma.cc/3BWJ-HTNP]; South
Carolina ex rel. Wilson v. Condon, 764 S.E.2d 247, 248 (S.C. 2014) [http://perma.cc/ZB95-2JHK].
59
Ex parte Alabama, 2015 WL 892752, at *25, *43; but see Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940, 941
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay) (criticizing Court’s “acquiescence” in
lower court decisions invalidating state bans as an inappropriate “signal of the Court’s intended
resolution of that question”).
60
Ed Brayton, AL Supreme Court Sets Up Big Showdown with Fed. Courts, FREETHOUGHTBLOGS
(Mar. 4, 2015), http://freethoughtblogs.com/dispatches/2015/03/04/al-supreme-court-sets-up-big-
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court and by Moore in particular,61 even though Moore did not participate in
the mandamus action. Again, however, a proper focus on the judicial
process shows that the state court did not “defy” federal courts or federal
law.
The court obviously disagreed with Judge Granade, as well as with the
weight of federal appellate and trial courts, on the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But interpretations of federal law by lower federal
courts do not bind state courts.62 State courts considering federal law issues
function as inferior federal tribunals; they are vested with the same
interpretive leeway on the meaning of federal law as any lower federal
court, are bound only by superior Supreme Court precedent, and are subject
only to Supreme Court review.63 A federal district court in a state and a state
supreme court can diverge on a constitutional question, just as two federal
district courts (even within the same state) can diverge; one court is not
precluded from reaching a different decision than the other64 and one court’s
decision is not entitled to greater deference simply because it came first.
The Supreme Court of Alabama thus acted entirely within its unquestioned
power in reaching a different constitutional conclusion than did the federal
district court. One might disagree with the merits of that decision.65 But
disagreement with a state court decision on a question of federal law does
not render that decision illegitimate, any more than disagreement with
Judge Granade renders her decisions illegitimate. Nor do divergent results
mean that one court has rebelled against the other.
The real effect of the mandamus was practical rather than legal. The
order stripped probate judges of the option, which many had taken, of
voluntarily following Judge Granade’s decision and issuing licenses to
same-sex couples without awaiting a new lawsuit and injunction. But it also
permitted any probate judge subject to a federal injunction to be released
from the mandamus.66 In fact, Judge Granade and the Supreme Court of
Alabama agreed on the initial relationship between their respective orders.
The state court declined to release Judge Davis from the mandamus,
concluding that he already had satisfied the federal injunction by issuing
licenses to the four Strawser couples and was not under a continuing federal
showdown-with-fed-courts [http://perma.cc/69F9-8M75].
61
See, e.g., Lamparello, supra note 16; Krotoszynski, supra note 13.
62
See generally Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal
Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2015) [http://perma.cc/8BDUVZB8]; Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree on
Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2014) [http://perma.cc/U99U-939D].
63
James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 234 (2007) [http://perma.cc/VD73-YD8P].
64
Fallon, supra note 44, at 1340.
65
See generally Lamparello, supra note 16.
66
Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *42 (Ala. Mar. 3,
2015).
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obligation to issue licenses to anyone else.67 Judge Granade declined to stay
her injunction against Davis for the same reason—having performed as to
the named plaintiffs, Davis faced no conflicting federal and state
obligations.68
The state mandamus prompted a new federal procedural counter. In
May, Judge Granade certified Strawser as an injunctive class action.69 The
plaintiff class was defined as
All persons in Alabama who wish to obtain a marriage license in order to marry
a person of the same sex and to have the marriage recognized under Alabama
law, and who are unable to do so because of the enforcement of Alabama’s
laws prohibiting the issuance of marriage licenses to same sex couples and
barring recognition of their marriages.70

The defendant class was defined as “All Alabama county probate
judges who are enforcing or in the future may enforce Alabama’s laws
barring the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and refusing
to recognize their marriages.”71 In a separate order, Judge Granade extended
the preliminary injunction, previously entered against Davis in favor of four
couples, to prohibit the defendant class from enforcing the state’s same-sex
marriage ban and requiring them to issue marriage licenses to any member
of the plaintiff class who followed the proper steps towards obtaining a
license. This injunction required every Alabama probate judge to issue
licenses to any same-sex couples in Alabama who requested one, with
every judge subject to contempt for noncompliance. Recognizing the
“imminent” resolution of Obergefell, however, Judge Granade stayed the
class injunction “until the Supreme Court issues its ruling” on the
constitutional question.72
The class injunction did set up a potential conflict with the state
mandamus. But Judge Granade insisted this did not provide a basis for not
extending the injunction to the class. She explained that the choice for the
probate judges—comply with the state order by not issuing licenses or
comply with the federal order by issuing licenses—“should be simple” in
light of the Supremacy Clause and the way in which it empowers federal
courts to declare state laws invalid.73 No probate judge could be held liable
67

Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 1036064, at *1 (Ala. Mar. 10,
2015) [http://perma.cc/22MD-2ZFC].
68
Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 1186326, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/HM57-USMD].
69
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2) (establishing standards for class certification).
70
Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449251, at *1 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/N37Y-J9S7].
71
Id.
72
Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449468, at *1, *6 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/ACA8-95N2].
73
Id. at *4.
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for violating Alabama law by engaging in conduct required by the
Constitution—issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.74
While the conclusion was correct, this reasoning misunderstood the
conflict at issue. Judge Granade accurately described the role of the
Supremacy Clause in a collision between a state law and a federal
injunction applying the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent enforcement of
that state law. The conflict here, however, was between two judicial
decisions and orders—one state, one federal—measuring the validity of a
state law under competing interpretations of the federal Constitution. The
Supremacy Clause does not grant greater force to an order from a lower
federal court than to an order from a state court. Judge Granade’s
declaration that the Fourteenth Amendment required defendants to issue
licenses did not trump the state Supreme Court’s declaration that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require issuance of those licenses or that
state law could prohibit their issuance. Again, a conflict between a lower
federal court and a state supreme court stands on the same footing as a
conflict between two lower federal courts.
The better justification for rejecting the defendants’ argument was that
any potential conflict between the two orders did not compel the federal
court to stay its hand. First, as Judge Granade pointed out, Strawser was
filed and the original injunction entered before the state mandamus issued.75
Second, the competing orders were unlikely to ripen into a genuine federalstate conflict, because the state mandamus by its terms allowed probate
judges facing a competing federal injunction to seek and obtain release
from the mandamus.76 Class certification simply expanded the universe of
probate judges subject to the direct force of the federal injunction, thereby
expanding the universe of probate judges eligible to seek release from the
mandamus—from Judge Davis to every probate judge in the state. A
conflict or stalemate thus would arise only if the Supreme Court of
Alabama refused to grant the release and continued to enforce the
mandamus even against probate judges subject to the class injunction. But
the state court gave no indication that it intended to provoke such a direct
and open confrontation with a federal court. In any event, by staying the
class injunction pending Obergefell, Judge Granade preempted even that
possible conflict.
CONCLUSION: ALABAMA AFTER OBERGEFELL
Obergefell largely rendered Alabama’s final stand against marriage
equality a historical footnote. Although the Supreme Court did not speak
directly to Alabama law or directly enjoin Alabama officials, the decision
74
75
76
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served as binding precedent on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
And the decision quickly moved Alabama officials to resolve litigation over
that state’s ban.
Alabama Governor Robert Bentley and Attorney General Strange both
expressed profound disagreement with the decision, but pledged that they
would uphold the law of the land, which now included a right for same-sex
couples to marry on equal terms.77 The Strawser plaintiffs argued that the
stay of the class injunction, imposed “until the Supreme Court issues its
ruling,”78 lifted as soon as Obergefell issued; the injunction thus became
immediately effective without further order from the court, enforceable
through contempt proceedings against any probate judge who declined to
issue licenses to same-sex couples.79 The Association of County
Commissions recommended that probate judges begin issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples in the same manner and according to the same
requirements as opposite-sex couples.80 And Judge Granade quickly agreed
in a July 1 clarifying order, stating “by the language set forth in the order,
the preliminary injunction is now in effect and binding on all members of
the Defendant Class.”81 Probate judges in many parts of the state, including
Judge Davis in Mobile, began issuing licenses the day of the ruling.82
Especially given the Supreme Court-dictated conclusion, everything
that happened in Alabama in the months prior to Obergefell arguably
wasted time, effort, and thousands of taxpayer dollars, forcing couples to
bring additional federal lawsuits seeking discrete injunctions against
individual probate judges or to litigate ancillary non-merits issues such as
class certification. And the state Supreme Court’s mandamus arguably
represented a “quixotic” attempt by state officials and advocacy groups to

77

Arian Campo-Flores, Alabama Probate Judges Begin Issuing Licenses for Same-Sex Marriages,
WALL STREET J. L. BLOG (June 27, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/06/27/alabamaprobate-judges-begin-issuing-licenses-for-same-sex-marriages. Jeremy Diamond, Alabama Chief
Justice: Marriage Ruling Worse than Segregation Decision, CNN (June 28, 2015, 11:49 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/26/politics/roy-moore-conservatives-gay-marriage-alabama-react
[http://perma.cc/6JQ9-5E62].
78
Strawser, 2015 WL 2449468, at *6.
79
Memorandum from Counsel for Association of County Commissions of Alabama to Probate
Judges
(June
29,
2015),
available
at
http://acca.informz.net/ACCA/data/
images/Sonny%27s_Docs/Obergefell%20Memo%20FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/DN8Z-4T8E]; E-mail
from Plaintiff Class Counsel to Defense Class Counsel in Strawser v. Strange (June 26, 2015), available
at
http://acca.informz.net/ACCA/data/images/Sonny%27s_Docs/Strawservs%20Strange.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GXL9-H5DF].
80
Memorandum from Counsel for Association of County Commissions of Alabama, supra note 79.
81
Strawser v. Strange, No 14-0424-CG-C (S.D. Ala. July 1, 2015), available at
http://acca.informz.net/ACCA/data/images/Sonny's_Docs/145%20Order%20Grant%20M4%20Clarif%2
0%20and%20staying%20Prelim%20%20Injunct.pdf [http://perma.cc/R57Z-SGQR].
82
Kati Weis, Probate Judge Spends $200,000 in Tax Dollars to Fight Gay Marriage, EYEWITNESS
NEWS 3 (June 30, 2015, 4:36 AM), http://www.wfsb.com/story/29437289/probate-judge-spends200000-in-tax-dollars-to-fight-gay-marriage.

15

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

stop the inevitable,83 which finally arrived in Obergefell.
Of course, Obergefell did not settle the issue for everyone. The
Supreme Court of Alabama reminded probate judges that the parties in
Obergefell had twenty-five days to seek reconsideration in the Supreme
Court of the United States and ordered further briefing on the new
precedent’s effect on the state mandamus.84 Initially, several counties
declined to issue licenses to same-sex couples, others ceased issuing
licenses at all, and others insisted on waiting for the Supreme Court’s
mandate to issue,85 although those practices ended following Judge
Granade’s July 1 order clarifying that all probate judges statewide were
bound by an effective injunction.
And, as expected, Moore was the most vocal in opposition. Off the
bench, he argued that Obergefell was worse than Plessy v. Ferguson86 and
Supreme Court decisions about slavery,87 and warned that the decision
would lead to persecution of Christians,88 although he did not renew his
previous promises to defy any pro-marriage-equality decision.89 Moore’s
responses might suggest that he was as motivated by anti-LGBTQ animus
as George Wallace was by anti-African-American and anti-integration
animus.90 At the very least, Moore insisted, Obergefell did not take effect
until the twenty-five day period for seeking reconsideration had expired;91
he first argued that probate judges were prohibited from issuing licenses in
that time period, then revised his position to insist only that they were not
required to do so.92 Of course, both positions failed because both ignored
the immediate lifting of the stay of the Strawser injunction—it was that
order, not the Court’s broad constitutional statements in Obergefell, that
actually controlled Alabama officials as to Alabama law and compelled
them to issue licenses to same-sex couples.
The point, however, is that between January 2015 and June 26, 2015,
83
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Alabama officials were legally obligated to issue marriage licenses to four
same-sex couples. Beyond that, they were not legally obligated to adhere to
merely persuasive authority. They were not obligated by court orders in
actions to which they were not party or as to people who were not parties,
simply to preserve efficiency for civil rights plaintiffs or public perceptions
of the judiciary. And the Supreme Court of Alabama, like any lower federal
tribunal, was not bound to follow precedent from a coordinate federal
district court. There was no “defiance” in Alabama, only an insistence on
procedural regularity, which Obergefell ultimately provided and with which
most public officials appeared ready to comply.
More importantly, because marriage equality will not be the last civil
rights battle fought in the federal judiciary, it is essential that courts, parties,
attorneys, commentators, and the public account for and understand how
procedural mechanisms affect constitutional litigation and constitutional
change. While the controversy over marriage equality in Alabama shared
the unfortunate rhetoric of past controversies over integration, comparing
the demand for procedural regularity with George Wallace’s grandstanding
refusal to comply with an explicit injunction is ill-advised, legally
erroneous, historically inaccurate, and dismissive of the significance of
formal judicial processes.
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